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TRADING: THE CASE FOR INDIVIDUAL 
CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
ORLANDO COSME JR.* 
The popular imagination of securities trading is a chaotic, physical 
stock exchange—a busy floor with hurried traders yelling, “buy, buy, buy!”  
While this image is a Hollywood and media favorite, it is no longer 
accurate.  In 2019, most securities trading is conducted electronically on 
digital markets.  One type of trading strategy, high-frequency trading, 
utilizes algorithms, data centers, fiber optic cables, and supercomputers to 
obtain an edge in the market.  High-frequency trading has leveraged 
advancements in technology to constitute over half of all trading volume in 
a given day. 
High-frequency trading, however, has come under scrutiny in recent 
years as it has increased market susceptibility to certain forms of criminal 
conduct.  In 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld 
the first conviction of a high-frequency trader for spoofing, a type of trader 
misconduct that is made more susceptible by high-frequency trading.  While 
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scholars have debated whether high-frequency trading should be regulated 
more than other types of trading and if so, what the regulations might look 
like, no one has analyzed criminal law as a vehicle to regulate high-
frequency trading. 
This Comment makes the case that individual criminal liability is an 
ideal tool to regulate misconduct in the high-frequency trading space.  Two 
features of high-frequency trading make the strategy particularly 
challenging to regulate: 1) it is difficult to draw a line between legitimate 
and illegitimate behavior in high-frequency trading; and 2) it is difficult to 
pinpoint an exact definition of what high-frequency trading is.  Criminal 
liability has several advantages over civil liability with respect to these 
challenges.  First, the mens rea component and higher standard of proof 
required in criminal liability will ensure that high-frequency traders found 
criminally liable engaged in illegitimate behavior with a higher degree of 
certainty.  Second, the threat of criminal prosecution will better serve the 
goal of deterring high-frequency trader misconduct.  Within the context of 
criminal liability, individual criminal liability is preferable to corporate 
criminal liability because the former better furthers the goal of deterrence.  
The identity problem that corporate liability helps to solve—in some 
corporate contexts it is impossible to pinpoint culpability on any single 
individual—is not an issue in high-frequency trading; and individual 
criminal liability is socially more preferable as a matter of policy.  
Accordingly, the government should increase criminal enforcement of high-
frequency traders to promote its goal of safeguarding market integrity. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Technology has crept into most aspects of modern society, and 
securities trading is no different.1  Gone are the iconic days of traders 
yelling in the “pits” of stock exchanges.2  Nowadays, trading occurs on 
computer screens in digital markets.3  Trading has moved from the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) to data centers, fiber optic cables, and 
supercomputers located far from Wall Street.4  One trading strategy, high-
frequency trading (HFT), leverages this advancement in technology by 
utilizing sophisticated computer programs that trade at ultrafast speeds to 
obtain an edge in the market.5  While HFT has many benefits, such as 
increased market efficiency,6 it also has “increased market susceptibility to 
certain forms of criminal conduct.”7 
 
 1 Gregory Meyer, Trading: What Happened when the Pit Stopped, FIN. TIMES (July 6, 
2016), https://www.ft.com/content/4d221b22-3dfb-11e6-8716-a4a71e8140b0 (source on file 
with author). 
 2 Id. See also Craig Pirrong, Commodity Market Manipulation Law: A (Very) Critical 
Analysis and a Proposed Alternative, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 945, 948 (1994): 
Futures contracts are bought and sold in centralized trading ‘pits’ in an open outcry 
auction. Customers submit buy and sell orders for futures contracts to brokerage 
firms. These firms transmit the orders to brokers located in the pit. The brokers call 
out their desire to buy or sell, and other traders in the pit compete to take the other 
side of the trade. The broker accepts the best bid or offer made in the pit to fill his 
order. In addition to trading for customers, some pit participants trade on their own 
account. Id. 
 3 United States v. Coscia, 866 F.3d 782, 785 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 4 Tom C.W. Lin, The New Market Manipulation, 66 EMORY L. J. 1253, 1255 (2017). 
 5 Coscia, 866 F.3d at 786. 
 6 Lazaro I. Vazquez, High Frequency Trading: Is Regulation the Answer?, 17 WAKE 
FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 151, 172 (2017). 
 7 Coscia, 866 F.3d at 786; see also SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, CONCEPT RELEASE ON 
EQUITY MARKET STRUCTURE, 75 Fed Reg 3594, 3606 (2010) (noting four strategies that are 
particularly susceptible to wrongdoing by HFT). 
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The 2008 Financial Crisis brought the regulation of financial markets 
under increased scrutiny.8  This increased scrutiny coincided with the rise 
of HFT.9  The public, frustrated with the financial sector, demanded 
reforms to ensure that Wall Street did not continue with business as usual.10  
Events such as the Flash Crash—during which on May 6, 2010, several 
markets, aided partly by HFT, quickly collapsed and rebounded—ensured 
that HFT did not escape these calls for more regulation.11  However, 
Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act, the main legislative response to the 
financial crisis, in 2010—a few years before HFT obtained market 
hegemony.  Accordingly, the law has no provision that specifically 
regulates HFT.12  But what should this regulation be?  One tool that 
governments can use to regulate high-frequency trader misconduct is 
individual criminal liability.  In August 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit affirmed United States v. Coscia,13 upholding the first 
criminal conviction of a high-frequency trader for spoofing—increasing the 
relevance of individual corporate criminal liability for illegal high-
frequency trading.14 
Following the example in Coscia, prosecuting traders in HFT—as 
opposed to the entities that the traders work for or other forms of 
 
 8 See Anna Driggers, Raj Rajaratnam’s Historic Insider Trading Sentence, 49 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 2021, 2034 (2012) (“In response to the 2008 financial crisis, there has been 
public outrage and demand for punishment of those on Wall Street.”). 
 9 See Thomas Lee Hazen, Treatise on the Law of Securities Regulation § 14:14 (Oct. 
2017). 
 10 See Driggers, supra note 8, at 2034. 
 11 Andrei Kirilenko, et al., The Flash Crash: The Impact of High Frequency Trading on 
an Electronic Market 1 (May 5, 2014); Peter J. Henning, Why High-Frequency Trading is So 
Hard to Regulate, DealBook, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2014, 1:40 PM), 
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/20/why-high-frequency-trading-is-so-hard-to-
regulate/ [http://perma.cc/4RTQ-X62V]. 
 12 See R. Rex Chatterjee, Dictionaries Fail: The Volcker Rule’s Reliance on Definitions 
Renders it Ineffective and a New Solution is Needed to Adequately Regulate Proprietary 
Trading, 8 B.Y.U. INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 33, 34 (2011); Vazquez, supra note 6, at 163 
(discussing how “[v]ery little, if any, federal statutory law directly targets the practice of 
HFT[,]” including the Dodd-Frank Act). The Dodd-Frank Act mentions “high-frequency 
trading” only once. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, PUB. L. 
NO. 111-203 124 STAT. 1976 (2010) [hereinafter “DFA”]. The provision commands the 
Securities and Exchange Commission to conduct a study of “the effect of high-frequency 
trading and other technological advances on the market and what the SEC requires to 
monitor the effect of such trading and advances on the market[.]” DFA § 967 (a)(1)–(2)(D). 
 13 United States v. Coscia, 866 F.3d 782, 785 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 14 Reuters Staff, U.S. Appeals Court Upholds Trader’s Spoofing Conviction, REUTERS 
(Aug. 7, 2017, 7:20 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-spoofing/u-s-appeals-
court-upholds-traders-spoofing-conviction-idUSKBN1AO00F [http://perma.cc/FZ8A-
MJGU]. 
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regulation—would better serve the government’s goal of promoting fair and 
efficient financial markets.  While scholars have discussed which legal 
tools should be used to regulate and police high-frequency trading,15 no one 
has analyzed individual criminal liability as a possible solution.  This 
Comment does so.  But it leaves further discussion on the topic—like 
potential HFT criminal legislation or ways to increase criminal HFT 
enforcement—to future scholarship. 
First, this Comment provides necessary background information.  This 
includes an explanation of HFT and the issues that arise in attempting to 
regulate the practice, elaboration of the current HFT regulatory landscape, 
and a description of the laws currently impacting HFT.  Next, this 
Comment shows how criminal law can better ensure that high-frequency 
traders are not penalized for legitimate trading activity, which is a major 
concern of HFT regulation,16 while still deterring other high-frequency 
traders from engaging in wrongdoing.  Finally, this Comment argues that 
within criminal law, individual liability should be used because it better 
furthers the goal of deterrence.  Culpable individuals are easily identifiable 
in HFT, and, when applied to HFT, individual criminal liability leads to 
preferable consequences.  Therefore, criminal enforcement of wrongdoing 
through individual liability should be utilized to regulate HFT. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. AN OVERVIEW OF HFT 
Although pinning down a precise definition has confounded 
regulators,17 the fundamental mechanism at the core of HFT is fairly 
straightforward: trading firms execute large volumes of trades at lightning 
fast speeds with the help of computer software.18  An example of a simple 
HFT strategy, exchange arbitrage, is illustrative.  In exchange arbitrage, 
high-frequency traders take advantage of the minor discrepancies in a 
security’s price that occur between different exchanges.19  The trader buys 
low on one exchange and then sells high on another.20  The speed at which 
these trades are executed is vital because the price discrepancies between 
 
 15 See, e.g., Vazquez, supra note 6, at 151.  
 16 Peter J. Henning, Why High-Frequency Trading is So Hard to Regulate, N.Y. TIMES: 
DEALBOOK (Oct. 20, 2014, 1:40 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/20/why-high-
frequency-trading-is-so-hard-to-regulate/ [http://perma.cc/4RTQ-X62V].  
 17 See Vazquez, supra note 6, at 160.  
 18 Coscia, 866 F.3d at 786.  
 19 Id.  
 20 Id.  
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exchanges only last for a very short period of time—often fractions of a 
second.21  Although such price discrepancies are extremely small, 
significant profits can be made with high volumes of trades.22 
Speed is vital to any HFT strategy. To ensure that they are trading the 
fastest, HFT firms lease or purchase property as close to exchange data 
centers and servers as possible.23  HFT firms also purchase (from 
exchanges) special access to high-speed cables—allowing them to trade on 
the exchange more quickly.24  Accordingly, HFT gains its market advantage 
by superior and faster trading connections. 
Concerns over HFT have grown since the Flash Crash,25 which I will 
discuss later in Part II of this Comment, and as the percentage of HFT in 
terms of total trading volume has increased to between “40 to 70 percent of 
all trading.”26  As of 2016, HFT constituted a $28 billion industry.27 
Although the rise of HFT has raised some concerns, there are many 
positive effects of the practice. First, it can be very profitable for the trader 
and trading firm.28  Second, HFT is beneficial to capital markets because it 
increases liquidity.29  Liquidity is one of the most, if not the most, important 
market characteristics that investors consider.30  By acting “as a sort of 
shock absorber,” liquidity smooths volatile price swings.31  Additionally, 
increased liquidity from HFT increases the willingness of intermediaries 
that buy and sell securities on their own account (market makers) to transact 
trades, which in turn further increases liquidity and trading volume.32  
Increased liquidity from HFT has also decreased transaction costs.33  
Finally, HFT arbitrage closes gaps between markets and allows prices to 
more quickly reflect new information.34  Thus, HFT makes markets more 
efficient.35 
 
 21 Id.  
 22 Id.  
 23 See MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: A WALL STREET REVOLT 62–63, 73, 79 (2014).  
 24 Lin, supra note 4, at 1267.  
 25 Henning, supra note 16.  
 26 Thomas Lee Hazen, Treatise on the Law of Securities Regulation § 14:14 (October 
2017).  
 27 Vazquez, supra note 6, at 163.  
 28 United States v. Coscia, 866 F.3d 782, 786 (7th Cir. 2017).  
 29 Vazquez, supra note 6, at 171.  
 30 Id.  
 31 Id. (internal quotations omitted).  
 32 Id.  
 33 Id. at 172.  
 34 Id.  
 35 Id.  
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Some of these perceived benefits, however, may actually negatively 
impact the market.  Scholars have noted that HFT can harm traditional 
investors.36  For example, consider the following scenario: An individual 
calls their broker to submit an order to buy $60,000 worth of a certain 
stock.  The broker can currently buy the stock for $60 per share, requiring 
1,000 shares at that price to fill the individual’s order.  The broker notices 
that 500 shares of the stock are being offered on NASDAQ, 300 shares are 
being offered on the NYSE, and 200 shares on the BATS Global exchange.  
The broker submits orders in all three exchanges to purchase the 1,000 
shares.  However, after clicking “submit” on his computer, the broker 
receives a notification that he purchased less than 1,000 shares.  Surprised, 
he looks at his screen and sees that the cheapest offer for the stock is now 
above $60.37  Due to their speed and information edge, high-frequency 
traders were able to notice “the first portion of the broker’s order on one 
exchange, registered that he was interested in purchasing that security, 
bought it themselves on the second exchange, and offered it back to the 
broker at a higher price when his request reached the second exchange.”38  
Because the high-frequency traders anticipated a larger trade when the 
order first began to fill, the traditional investor either had to settle with less 
than the 1,000 shares she ordered or fill the order at a higher price.39  Thus, 
by quickly buying and selling securities, HFT unnecessarily raises prices 
for non-HFT firms.40 
Furthermore, even though HFT has been noted to smooth out 
volatility, it can also paradoxically increase volatility.41  Situations may 
occur where, due to HFT being a form of algorithmic trading, “a predatory 
algorithm can lock in a profit for a proprietary firm from an artificial 
increase or decrease in price.”42  This can cause a security’s price to move 
substantially for no tangible reason, causing traders to lose significant 
amounts of money.43 
Additionally, the speed at which high-frequency traders can execute 
trades “has increased market susceptibility to certain forms of criminal 
 
 36 Tara E. Levens, Too Fast, Too Frequent? High-Frequency Trading and Securities 
Class Actions, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1511, 1532–33 (2015) (citing LEWIS, supra note 23, at 
171).  
 37 For a similar example, see id. at 1511. 
 38 Id.  
 39 Id.  
 40 See Lewis, supra note 23, at 76, 78.  
 41 Id.  
 42 Id. at 175.  
 43 Id.  
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conduct.”44  One such strategy is spoofing45—where traders enter buy and 
sell orders for a security with no intention of executing the order, but rather 
to manipulate the price of the security in a certain direction so that they 
profit.46 
Moreover, another key feature of HFT is that it can blur the line 
between legitimate trading activity and market manipulation.47  Market 
manipulation was prohibited as part of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934.48  The relevant provision states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly . . . . 
(1) For the purpose of creating a false or misleading appearance of active trading in 
any security other than a government security, or a false or misleading appearance 
with respect to the market for any such security, (A) to effect any transaction in such 
security which involves no change in the beneficial ownership thereof, or (B) to enter 
an order or orders for the purchase of such security with the knowledge that an order 
or orders of substantially the same size, at substantially the same time, and at 
substantially the same price, for the sale of any such security, has been or will be 
entered by or for the same or different parties, or (C) to enter any order or orders for 
the sale of any such security with the knowledge that an order or orders of 
substantially the same size, at substantially the same time, and at substantially the 
same price, for the purchase of such security, has been or will be entered by or for the 
same or different parties. 
(2) To effect, alone or with 1 or more other persons, a series of transactions in any 
security registered on a national securities exchange, any security not so registered, or 
in connection with any security-based swap or security-based swap agreement with 
respect to such security creating actual or apparent active trading in such security, or 
raising or depressing the price of such security, for the purpose of inducing the 
purchase or sale of such security by others.49 
Accordingly, a high-frequency trader may violate this provision if they 
enter simultaneous buy and sell orders to purposely create “a false or 
misleading appearance of active trading[.]”  Once the market moves in one 
direction, the trader can use their speed to cancel their orders on the side of 
the market that would lead to losses, while keeping and filling their orders 
on the other side of the market that is favorable to the price movement—
ensuring profits.  Thus, high cancellation rates can be evidence of market 
 
 44 United States v. Coscia, 866 F.3d 782, 786 (7th Cir. 2017).  
 45 Id.  
 46 John I. Sanders, Spoofing: A Proposal for Normalizing Divergent Securities and 
Commodities Futures Regimes, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 517, 518–19 (2016).  
 47 See Vazquez, supra note 6, at 175.  
 48 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2012).  
 49 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(1)–(2) (2012).  
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manipulation.50  However, some legitimate HFT strategies that place 
multiple bids and offers may also lead to high cancellation rates.51  
Therefore, certain HFT strategies must be observed carefully because high 
cancellation rates can indicate both a high-frequency trader engaging in 
market manipulation and providing market liquidity.52  This blurring 
between legitimate and illegitimate behavior will be discussed more 
thoroughly in the Regulating HFT section of this Comment. 
B. THE FLASH CRASH 
The negative impact of high-frequency trading caught the world’s 
attention after the Flash Crash.53  During a thirty-six minute period on the 
afternoon of May 6, 2010, American markets experienced one of the most 
volatile periods in their history.54  Major stock market indices, such as the 
S&P 500, Dow Jones Industrial Average, Nasdaq 100, and the Russell 
2000, “collapsed and rebounded with extraordinary velocity.”55  The rapid 
collapse and just-as-sudden rebound was not limited to the stock market. 
Futures, options, and exchange-traded funds (ETFs) “experienced 
extraordinary price volatility often accompanied by spikes in trading 
volume.”56  Given the rapid collapse of prices across financial markets, 
these events became known as the “Flash Crash.”57 
HFT has been cited as a factor in the Flash Crash.  Michael Lewis’ 
book, Flash Boys: A Wall Street Revolt, increased scrutiny of HFT by 
linking them to the events of May 6, 2010.58  Lewis specifically criticized 
HFT’s use of complex computer programs that “whipsaw prices by 
flooding the market with orders in milliseconds.”59  The Commodity Future 
Trading Commission (CFTC) has also stated that HFT was a contributor to 
the Flash Crash.60  According to the CFTC, the ability of HFT to quickly 
absorb trading volume creates price adjustments that are costly to 
 
 50 Id.  
 51 Vazquez, supra note 6, at 157.  
 52 Id. at 171.  
 53 Henning, supra note 16.  
 54 See generally Andrei Kirilenko, et al., The Flash Crash: The Impact of High 
Frequency Trading on an Electronic Market, J. FIN. 1 (2014).  
 55 Id.  
 56 Id.  
 57 Id.  
 58 Henning, supra note 16.  
 59 Id.  
 60 Kirilenko, supra note 54.  
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traditional market makers and other slower traders.61   This incentivizes 
market makers to keep “their inventory holdings to levels that can be too 
low to offset temporary liquidity imbalances.”62   As a result, a gigantic sell 
order can “lead to a liquidity-based crash accompanied by high trading 
volume and large price volatility.”63   This is what occurred during the 
Flash Crash with E-mini S&P 500 stock index futures—which then spread 
quickly to other markets.64   The Flash Crash, or the potential for other 
similar events, along with the increased susceptibility to illegitimate 
trading, demonstrates the need to provide some sort of oversight to HFT. 
C. REGULATING HFT 
Regulating HFT raises two major challenges.   First, it is difficult to 
discern the difference between legitimate and illegitimate behavior due to 
the complexities of HFT trading strategies.65   Second, even if a bright line 
could be drawn, there is no settled definition as to what constitutes HFT.66 
1. Drawing a Line Between Acceptable and Unacceptable Behavior 
The difficulty in separating legitimate and illegitimate behavior is 
particularly an issue when the HFT acts as a market maker—an 
intermediary handling client trades on the HFT’s own account.67   Market 
makers often have the liberty “to select the venue of [their] choice at no or 
little cost to [their] client[s].”68   What makes wrongdoing by HFT market 
makers so difficult to separate from legitimate behavior is that the client-
facing business provides the market maker with a justification for many 
trades.69   For example, a high-frequency trader involved in market making 
 
 61 Id.  
 62 Id.  
 63 Id.  
 64 Id. S&P 500, Dow Jones Industrial Average, Nasdaq 100, and the Russell 2000, as 
well as derivatives such as futures, options, and ETFs collapsed and rebounded.  
 65 Henning, supra note 16.  
 66 See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N , CONCEPT RELEASE ON EQUITY MARKET STRUCTURE, 
supra note 7 (noting that it is better to focus on tools and strategies employed by HFT “than 
attempt any single, precise definition of HFT”).  
 67 See Andrew Verstein, Benchmark Manipulation, 56 B.C. L. REV. 215, 264 n.267 
(2015) (“These difficulties [of showing that a trader is acting manipulatively] are only 
greater when the trader is an intermediary handling trades for a client . . . ”).  
 68 Id.  
 69 See id.  
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can state that any suspect trades were simply made to hedge a client’s 
order.70   As Andrew Verstein noted: 
The presence of an offsetting customer order is helpful circumstantial evidence for 
the manipulator. Indeed, it is telling that regulators will be drawn down the rabbit hole 
of showing a lack of offsetting customer orders; historically, the CFTC has spent its 
time trying to show the presence of offsetting orders. The Commodity Exchange Act 
specifically prohibits wash trades, or transactions designed to offset one another and 
thereby eliminate any economic substance. Complex institutions with responsibilities 
for other people’s money gain a smokescreen against regulatory scrutiny as they 
pursue non-fraudulent manipulations.71 
Therefore, the nature of legitimate client-driven trading business blurs 
the line between legal and illegal HFT conduct. 
A 2014 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) settlement 
against Athena Capital Research demonstrates the difficulty regulators have 
in drawing a line between legal and illegal conduct in HFT.72  The SEC 
called the settlement the “first high frequency trading manipulation case.”73  
The settlement order stated that Athena utilized a sophisticated algorithm 
that carried out a manipulative scheme where it would enter trading orders 
in the last two seconds of trading in order to push stock prices in a direction 
that would favor their other positions.74  The difficulty with respect to 
regulation, however, arose in determining whether the trader intended to 
either artificially affect prices—and therefore commit market 
manipulation—or simply generate profit with trades that had a genuine 
economic purpose.75 
 
 70 See id. For example, a client may go to a HFT market maker wishing to sell 
$1,000,000 of a certain security. If the high-frequency trader decides to fulfill the order, then 
they would buy the security using the high-frequency trader’s own account. Thus, the high-
frequency trader would be “long” $1,000,000 worth of that security. To hedge their exposure 
from this client-generated long position, the high-frequency trader may sell that security, sell 
another correlated security, or buy/sell a correlated derivative.  
 71 Id. at 264 n.267.  
 72 See Press Release, SEC Charges New York-Based High Frequency Trading Firm With 
Fraudulent Trading to Manipulate Closing Prices: First High Frequency Trading 
Manipulation Case, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Oct. 16, 2014), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2014-229#.VEOZlfldV8E [http://perma.cc/RJ9P-
GE46].  
 73 Id.  
 74 Athena Capital Research, LLC, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 73369, 
Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-16199, at 2 (SEC Oct. 16, 2014).  
 75 See Henning, supra note 16. See also Andrew Verstein, Benchmark Manipulation, 56 
B.C. L. REV. 215, 263 (2015) (“Courts seem to agree that a party cannot be a manipulator if 
she makes only real trades with sufficient genuine economic purposes. That is, an actual 
purchase of securities, motivated by a desire to own the securities, cannot be manipulation, 
even if you also wished to influence the price.”).  
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In the Athena case, the SEC used e-mails from Athena managers, 
which stated that the goal of that particular algorithm was to change 
prices.76  The settlement order also contained internal e-mails stating that 
the firm’s strategy was to dominate the auction and “owning the game.”77  
Yet, it appears from the SEC’s order that these statements alone may not 
have been sufficient to prove illegal market manipulation.78  Additionally, 
the order provided great detail about how Athena would enter buy or sell 
orders ten minutes before the 4 p.m. close, and then would “flood[] the 
market with orders on the opposite side of that trade in the last two seconds 
of trading.”79  This would push the price for that stock towards the order 
entered ten minutes before the close and allow a profit from the price 
movement.80  However, Athena also provided a service to clients via its 
trading by acting as a market maker and executing orders that may not have 
been filled at the close.81  At least some of Athena’s trades, then, assisted 
investors.82  It therefore appears that trading conduct or statements 
indicating a purpose to change prices are not sufficient on their own to 
prove illegal market manipulation. 
2. Defining HFT 
The lack of any set definition of HFT makes regulatory oversight 
difficult.  To provide regulatory oversight, an agency would have to invent 
its own definition of HFT.83  Defining HFT would necessarily require 
distinguishing HFT from other types of trading.  However, the proliferation 
of computer-assisted tools in modern day trading has made this separation 
problematic.84  Notwithstanding this challenge, an agency would then have 
to supervise firms that fall within this definition, and these firms would 
 
 76 Henning, supra note 16.  
 77 Press Release, supra note 72.  
 78 See Henning, supra note 16.  
 79 Id.  
 80 See id.  
 81 Id.  
 82 Id.  
 83 See Vazquez, supra note 6, at 160.  
 84 See Staff of the Division of Trading and Markets, Equity Market Structure Literature 
Review: Part II; High Frequency Trading at *5 (SEC, Mar 18, 2014) (“other types of 
computer-assisted trading tools are common in today’s markets that may generate market 
activity that is difficult to distinguish from HFT . . . . These tools include smart order routing 
systems that are designed to deal with the large number of trading venues in the fragmented 
U.S. equity market structure.”). 
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have to meet certain requirements.85  The agency would have to examine 
the regulated firm and “determine which specific trades warrant civil [or] 
criminal liability” (illegal trades).86  While providing the benefit of policing 
illegitimate behavior, such oversight would also be burdensome and costly 
for both the agency and the firms being regulated.87  The main issue with 
this regulatory regime, however, is that attempts to define the practice are 
either under- or over-inclusive, with problems arising from each scenario.88  
American agencies have currently adopted an over-inclusive 
“characteristic and attribute oriented approach” to define HFT.89  The 
elements of this definition include both legal and illegal trades.90  This 
approach to defining HFT overlaps with the characteristics and attributes 
associated with other non-HFT algorithmic and automated trading strategies 
(ATS).91  For example, the SEC has noted a common ATS which utilizes 
large order execution algorithms on behalf of institutional investors.92  
These algorithms “take[] institutional investor orders, which typically are 
too large to be executed all at once without excessive price impact, and 
slice[] them into many small orders that are fed into the marketplace over 
time.”93  The SEC noted that these large order execution algorithms should 
not be considered “HFT because they typically enable institutional 
investors to establish or liquidate positions with time horizons far beyond 
the primarily intraday horizons characteristic of HFT.”94  These non-HFT 
ATS do not have the same susceptibility to illegal trades and consequently 
 
 85 See Vazquez, supra note 6, at 160. The SEC, for example, utilizes several 
characteristics to define HFT. Staff of the Division of Trading and Markets, supra note 84 at 
*4. These include: 
1. Use of extraordinarily high speed and sophisticated programs for generating, 
routing, and executing orders. 2. Use of co-location services and individual data feeds 
offered by exchanges and others to minimize network and other latencies. 3. Very 
short time-frames for establishing and liquidating positions. 4. Submission of 
numerous orders that are cancelled shortly after submission. 5. Ending the trading day 
in as close to a flat position as possible (that is, not carrying significant, unhedged 
positions overnight). Id.  
 86 Vazquez, supra note 6, at 160.  
 87 See id.  
 88 See id. See also SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, CONCEPT RELEASE ON EQUITY MARKET 
STRUCTURE, supra note 7 (SEC admitting that its own definition of HFT is both over and 
under-inclusive).  
 89 Vazquez, supra note 6, at 160.  
 90 Id. at 160–61.  
 91 Id.  
 92  SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 7 at 3606.  
 93 Staff of the Division of Trading and Markets, supra note 84 at 5.  
 94 Id. 
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do not warrant the same type of oversight.95  Thus, in an attempt to rein in 
illegal behavior by HFT firms, this definition would capture non-HFT firms 
engaged in acceptable trading activity and hold them to closer scrutiny.96  
Such an outcome would be inefficient as it would waste resources and 
increase costs for both the regulator and supervised firms.97 
However, an under-inclusive definition is also problematic.  In an 
under-inclusive definition, firms that do not meet the specific thresholds for 
regulation would avoid oversight altogether.98  This would allow HFT firms 
that do not meet the narrow definition to be able to conduct illegal trades 
without consequence.99  For example, while admitting that its own 
definition is over-inclusive, the SEC has also stated that its definition of 
HFT is simultaneously under-inclusive as well because limiting HFT to the 
specific characteristics it had identified100 would “inappropriately narrow 
the range of firms that are classified as HFT.”101  To avoid this, regulators, 
such as the SEC, could provide an additional set of measures to firms that 
do not meet these specific criteria, but still conduct similar strategies.102  
Such an approach, however, “would be unnecessarily costly and expose 
regulators to multiple rounds of administrative oversight.”103  Accordingly, 
the difficulty in discerning legitimate and illegitimate HFT behavior and in 
even providing an accurate definition of the practice has made HFT 
regulation difficult. 
D. CURRENT LAWS IMPACTING HFT 
Current federal statutory law has very little, if any, direct focus on 
HFT.104  The Dodd-Frank Act’s Volcker Rule105 does limit banks’ abilities 
 
 95 See Vazquez, supra note 6, at 161.  
 96 Id. See also Staff of the Division of Trading and Markets, supra note 84 at *5 (noting 
that an issue with the SEC’s definition of HFT is that “in the absence of trading account 
data, the use of general proxies for HFT that can be calculated with publicly available, 
market-wide data may capture a great deal of algorithmic and computer-assisted trading that 
should not be classified as HFT.”).  
 97 See Vazquez, supra note 6, at 160.  
 98 Id.  
 99 Id.  
 100 Staff of the Division of Trading and Markets, supra note 84, at *4 (stating the 
characteristics that the SEC has identified to define HFT).  
 101 Id. 
 102 See Vazquez, supra note 6, at 160.  
 103 Id.  
 104 Id.at 163.  
 105 The Volcker Rule, or § 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act, restricts certain banking entities 
from engaging in certain financial activities, such as proprietary trading, investing in private 
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to engage in HFT strategies through restrictions on their ability to trade.106  
However, many of the entities that engage in HFT are not banks, but rather 
hedge funds, proprietary trading firms, or mutual funds.107  In practice, the 
Volcker Rule has simply made HFT shift away from large banks towards 
these smaller HFT firms.108 
The Dodd-Frank Act did, however, target a practice that is made more 
feasible through HFT by amending the Commodities and Exchange Act 
(CEA) to criminalize spoofing.109  As mentioned previously, The Dodd-
Frank Act defines spoofing as “bidding or offering with the intent to cancel 
the bid or offer before execution[.]”110  John I. Sanders further defines 
spoofing as a strategy where a trader, or spoofer, places “large trades in 
hopes of inducing others to act in response to those trades; the ‘spoofer’ 
then cancels his initial trades in order to capture a profit on trading 
positions he holds on the opposite side of the market.”111  Spoofing, similar 
to legitimate HFT, uses lightning fast trading strategies.112  Whereas 
legitimate trading takes advantage of naturally occurring market events, 
spoofing involves artificially moving the price of a security.113  The 
Seventh Circuit has explained simply how this artificial price movement 
can occur: 
This artificial movement is accomplished in a number of ways, although it is most 
simply realized by placing large and small orders on opposite sides of the market. The 
small order is placed at a desired price, which is either above or below the current 
market price, depending on whether the trader wants to buy or sell. If the trader wants 
to buy, the price on the small batch will be lower than the market price; if the trader 
wants to sell, the price on the small batch will be higher. Large orders are then placed 
on the opposite side of the market at prices designed to shift the market toward the 
price at which the small order was listed.114 
Thus, while not mentioning HFT by name, Congress did target one 
illegitimate trading strategy that has been made much easier through HFT.  
 
equity funds, and investing in private equity funds. R. Rex Chatterjee, Dictionaries Fail: The 
Volcker Rule’s Reliance on Definitions Renders it Ineffective and a New Solution is Needed 
to Adequately Regulate Proprietary Trading, 8 B.Y.U. INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 33, 34 
(2011).  
 106 Vazquez, supra note 6, at 163.  
 107 Id.  
 108 Id.  
 109 United States v. Coscia, 866 F.3d 782, 786 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Coscia, 
100 F. Supp. 3d 653, 656 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (unpublished).  
 110 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5)(c) (2012).  
 111 Sanders, supra note 46, at 518–19.  
 112 Coscia, 866 F.3d at 787.  
 113 Id.  
 114 Id.  
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E. UNITED STATES V. COSCIA 
In 2017, the Seventh Circuit upheld the first conviction based on this 
anti-spoofing provision.115  The case, Coscia, helps to illustrate an example 
of distinguishing illegal HFT practices from legal ones and how individual 
criminal liability can regulate them.  In 2014, Coscia was indicted for 
commodities fraud and spoofing based on trading activity he conducted for 
approximately ten weeks in 2011.116  About a year after being charged, a 
jury found him guilty on all counts.117  Testimony at the trial showed that 
during these ten weeks, Coscia would conduct a very particular pattern of 
trading activity. 118 If he wanted to buy, Coscia would place a small order 
below the current market price.119  He would then place large sell orders, at 
ten times the amount of the small buy order, above the current market price, 
on the other side of the market.120  The large orders would create a 
perception of abundant market supply, pushing the market price down.121  
At trial, the government introduced evidence that Coscia intended to cancel 
the large orders before they were executed with the help of two 
programs.122  The creators of the programs testified that Coscia directed 
them to make the program “act like a decoy” and so designed it to “get a 
reaction from the other algorithms.”123  One creator testified that he created 
the algorithm to cancel the large orders “in three particular circumstances: 
(1) based on the passage of time (usually measured in milliseconds); (2) the 
partial filling of the large orders; or (3) complete filling of the small 
orders.”124  The speed at which Coscia could place and cancel orders 
(milliseconds), and by extension HFT, is what allowed his illegal scheme to 
be successful and generate him profits.125 
Although there are benefits to HFT, situations like the Flash Crash and 
the illegal trades conducted by Coscia demonstrate the dangers of the 
practice.  Conduct like spoofing, which creates false supply and demand so 
 
 115 Nate Raymond, U.S. Appeals Court Upholds Trader’s Spoofing Conviction, REUTERS 
(Aug. 7, 2017), available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-spoofing/u-s-
appeals-court-upholds-traders-spoofing-conviction-idUSKBN1AO00F 
[http://perma.cc/FZ8A-MJGU].  
 116 Coscia, 866 F.3d at 787–88.  
 117 Id. at 790.  
 118 Id. at 788.  
 119 Id.  
 120 Id.  
 121 See id.  
 122 Id. at 788–89.  
 123 Id. at 789.  
 124 Id.  
 125 See id. at 788–89.  
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that the spoofer can profit, damages the integrity of the market and alienates 
investors.126  Without entering into a thorough analysis of whether 
regulation of HFT is appropriate, I will assume that these dangers are 
sufficient to warrant regulation of the practice. 
III. INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY AS A TOOL TO REGULATE HFT 
The rest of this Comment will argue that individual criminal liability 
for illegal conduct by high-frequency traders, as exemplified in Coscia, is 
an optimal enforcement paradigm for HFT regulation.  First, this Comment 
will show that certain advantages of criminal law make it preferable for 
ascertaining liability to other forms of regulation, especially as it applies to 
HFT.  It will also argue that criminal law would better further the goal of 
general deterrence.  Next, this Comment will make the case that the 
individual culpable traders should be prosecuted instead of the firms that 
employ them.  It will argue that individual criminal liability furthers the 
goal of deterrence more so than corporate criminal liability.  Moreover, it 
will highlight that one of the reasons for corporate criminal liability—the 
difficulty in identifying the culpable party—is not present in HFT.  Finally, 
this Comment will conclude by discussing the consequences of applying 
corporate criminal liability to HFT and demonstrating why individual 
criminal liability is more appropriate. 
A. ADVANTAGES OF CRIMINAL LAW 
1. Intentionality and Standard of Proof 
Criminal liability has major advantages over other forms of regulation 
with respect to illegitimate behavior in the HFT space.  First, criminal 
liability would better tackle a major concern in regulating HFT—how to 
differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate trades.  Given the speed at 
which high-frequency traders place and cancel orders, the difficulty in 
drawing a line between illusory and real supply-and-demand is greater.127  
Thus, the problem is more pressing compared to other traditional forms of 
trading.  Compared to civil liability, the mens rea component inherent in 
criminal liability, combined with criminal law’s heightened burden of proof 
 
 126 See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997) (“Although informational 
disparity is inevitable in the securities markets, investors likely would hesitate to venture 
their capital in a market where trading based on misappropriated nonpublic information is 
unchecked by law.”); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988) (“Who would 
knowingly roll the dice in a crooked crap game?”) (quoting Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys. 
Inc., 555 F. Supp. 535, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
 127 See Coscia, 866 F.3d at 787.  
382 COSME [Vol. 109 
standard, better ensures that liability is only found when a high-frequency 
trader clearly, and beyond a reasonable doubt, had the intention to engage 
in illegal trading. 
Criminal law functions to punish the culpable; those who do not have 
culpability should not be criminally sanctioned.128  Given the complexities 
of HFT, there may be a fear that a trader could be held criminally liable for 
legitimate behavior.  As the Athena Capital example showed, even though 
the firm was fined and given an administrative order, the possibility still 
existed that some of its trades served a purpose to clients via market 
making.129  Thus, the line in the HFT space between legal trading activity 
and wrongful conduct can be blurry.  However, criminal laws usually 
include a culpability, or mens rea, component130  that must be proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt.131  The requisite mens rea and higher burden of 
proof in an individual criminal prosecution would better ensure that high-
frequency traders actually committed illegal conduct. 
Coscia exemplifies this concept. In Coscia, the defendant argued that 
the definition of spoofing in the Dodd-Frank Act, even if it provided notice, 
was too arbitrary.132  Specifically, he noted “that high-frequency traders 
cancel 98% of orders before execution and that there are simply no 
‘tangible parameters to distinguish [Mr.] Coscia’s purported intent from 
that of the other traders.’”133  However, in the American criminal justice 
system, a defendant must prove that enforcement in his individual case was 
arbitrary to avoid being held criminally liable.134  Therefore, arbitrary 
enforcement would not be an issue because, like in Coscia, a defendant’s 
 
 128 J. Kelly Strader, (Re)Conceptulizing Insider Trading: United States v. Newman and 
the Intent to Defraud, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1419, 1425 (2015).  
 129 Henning, supra note 16.  
 130 See United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 (1978) (“We start with the 
familiar proposition that ‘[t]he existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the 
exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.’”) (alterations in 
original).  
 131 Stephen J. Morse & Morris B. Hoffman, The Uneasy Entente Between Legal Insanity 
and Mens Rea: Beyond Clark v. Arizona, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1071, 1074 (2007).  
 132 Coscia, 866 F.3d at 793.  
 133 Id.  
 134 See id. at 794: 
[T]he defendant must prove that his prosecution arose from arbitrary enforcement. As 
explained by the Second Circuit, this inquiry ‘involve[s] determining whether the 
conduct at issue falls so squarely in the core of what is prohibited by the law that 
there is no substantial concern about arbitrary enforcement because no reasonable 
enforcing officer could doubt the law’s application in the circumstances. 
(quoting Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 494 (2d Cir. 2006)).  
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conduct would have to fall well within a statute’s prohibited conduct to be 
convicted. 
Furthermore, Coscia also demonstrates how criminal law provides a 
solution to the blurry line between legitimate and illegitimate trading. In the 
Dodd Frank anti-spoofing provision, a defendant must have had “the intent 
to cancel the bid or offer before execution.”135  As the Seventh Circuit 
noted, “[c]riminal prosecution is thus limited to the pool of traders who 
exhibit the requisite criminal intent.”136  The court further opined: 
the anti-spoofing statute’s intent requirement renders spoofing meaningfully different 
from legal trades such as ‘stop-loss orders’ (‘an order to sell a security once it reaches 
a certain price’) or ‘fill-or-kill orders’ (‘an order that must be executed in full 
immediately, or the entire order is cancelled’) because those orders are designed to be 
executed upon the arrival of certain subsequent events. Spoofing, on the other hand, 
requires, an intent to cancel the order at the time it was placed.137 
Thus, like the anti-spoofing provision, Congress can criminalize unwanted 
practices in HFT that would avoid arbitrary enforcement by requiring an 
intentionality element in their statutes. 
2. General Deterrence 
Another advantage of using criminal law to regulate wrongdoing in 
HFT is that it would further the goals of general deterrence more than other 
forms of regulation.  For white collar cases in particular, general deterrence 
is the main focus.138  The threat of incarceration more potently discourages 
behavior than a system of pricing, such as civil liability.139  There may be 
some concern that convictions will lead to offenders going to jail for an 
unnecessarily long time.  This concern is likely inflamed by the recent trend 
in white collar crime of increased prison sentences.140  An example is the 
conviction of Raj Rajaratnam, who received the longest prison sentence for 
 
 135 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5)(C) (emphasis added).  
 136 Coscia, 866 F.3d. at 794.  
 137 Id. at 795 (emphasis added).  
 138 Todd Haugh, Sentencing the Why of White Collar Crime, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3143, 
3182 (2014).  
 139 Kip Schlegel et al., Are White-Collar Crimes Overcriminalized? Some Evidence on 
the Use of Criminal Sanctions Against Securities Violators, 28 W. ST. U. L. REV. 117, 134 
(2000–2001) (“A logical rationale for the extension of the criminal sanction to economic 
activity is the perceived need for more potent deterrents than those offered through a system 
of pricing. Incarceration and fines serve to inhibit these actions more than other methods of 
social control.”).  
 140 Driggers, supra note 8, at 2034 (“Rajaratnam’s prison sentence is likely . . . a 
reflection of the trend toward increased incarceration of white collar criminals generally.”).  
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insider trading in history.141  However, prosecutors do not need to seek out 
long sentences to be effective.142  In fact, it is the threat of prosecution 
period, and not the length of prison sentences, that will deter high-
frequency traders.143  Therefore, to increase deterrence of wrongdoing by 
high-frequency traders, prosecutors must simply increase criminal 
enforcement rather than seek long prison sentences. 
General deterrence dissuades society as a whole from engaging in a 
particular offense by legally punishing those who commit the offense.144  
There are two types of general deterrence—marginal general deterrence and 
absolute general deterrence.145  Marginal deterrence is the deterrent effect 
obtained from increasingly harsher penalties.146  However, studies suggest 
that increasing sentences for an already criminalized offense does not 
decrease the frequency of that offense.147  A 2014 study by the National 
Research Council analyzed numerous studies and found that there was 
almost no connection between the crime rate and harsh criminal 
penalties.148  Although some scholars argue that fewer white collar 
offenders should be imprisoned and that “[m]arginal general deterrence 
 
 141 Id. at 2021.  
 142 See Lucian E. Dervan, White Collar Overcriminalization: Deterrence, Plea Bargain, 
and the Loss of Innocence, 101 KY. L.J. 723, 740 (2013) (“As noted above, increasing 
sentences, particularly where the conduct is already criminalized, does not decrease the 
occurrence of the offense.”).  
 143 See id. at 739–40 (“Interestingly, studies in the same field indicate that the likelihood 
of apprehension and conviction does deter criminal behavior in a way that increasing 
sentencing severity does not.”).  
 144 Mirko Bagaric et al., Halting the Senseless Civil War Against White-Collar 
Offenders: “The Conduct Undermined the Integrity of the Markets” and Other Fallacies, 
206 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1019, 1064 (2016).  
 145 E.g., id. at 1064.  
 146 Id.  
 147  See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES, EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES  135 (Jeremy Travis et al. eds., 2014) 
(showing that sentencing enhancements created by “three-strike” laws had negligible or no 
effect on crime rates);  see also Bagaric et al., supra note 144, at 1064 (“The evidence 
suggests that marginal deterrence is a flawed theory”); Dervan, supra note 142, at 740 (“As 
noted above, increasing sentences, particularly where the conduct is already criminalized, 
does not decrease the occurrence of the offense.”); see also Sandeep Gopalan & 
 Mirko Bagaric, Progressive Alternatives to Imprisonment in an Increasingly  Punitive  
(And Self-Defeating)  Society, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 57, 93 (2016)  (“The empirical data 
on general deterrence suggests that absolute general deterrence is a valid theory. However, 
marginal general deterrence seems to be flawed.”).  
 148 Gopalan & Bagaric, supra note 147, at 93. 
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seems to be flawed in relation to all penalty types,” these scholars still 
concede that absolute general deterrence does have an effect.149 
Absolute general deterrence concerns whether there is any connection 
whatsoever between the occurrence of criminal conduct and criminal 
sanctions.150  Unlike marginal general deterrence, “[a]bsolute general 
deterrence does not require or support the imposition of harsh sanctions.” 
151 As opposed to marginal general deterrence, studies suggest that absolute 
general deterrence does indeed work.152  When people conduct a cost-
benefit analysis before committing crimes, they do not weigh what will 
happen to them if they are caught.153  Instead, they typically weigh the risk 
of getting caught itself.154  As Mirko Bagaric, Dan Hunter, and Gabriel 
Wolf have stated, “[t]he most effective means of reducing crime is not 
increasing criminal penalties, but rather encouraging the perception in 
people’s minds that, if they commit an offense, they will be detected and 
prosecuted.”155  Therefore, what would increase deterrence of HFT 
 
 149 Bagaric et al., supra note 144, at 1064–66 (“While there does not seem to be a link 
between higher penalties and less crime, it seems that people are not totally irrational when 
they contemplate committing crime. The evidence shows that to the extent that people make 
a cost-benefit decision about committing crimes, they generally only weigh up the risk of 
being caught, not what will happen when they are apprehended.”).  
 150 Id. at 1064.  
 151 Id.  
 152 Id. (“The evidence suggests . . . absolute general deterrence does work. There is a 
large body of literature devoted to this issue.”); Dervan, supra note 142, at 739–40 
(“Interestingly, studies in the same field indicate that the likelihood of apprehension and 
conviction does deter criminal behavior in a way that increasing sentencing severity does 
not.”); Driggers, supra note 8, at 2036 (“Some scholars have noted that potential criminals 
behave rationally in response to changes in law enforcement and crackdowns can have a 
general deterrent effect on individuals, at least initially.”). See also NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, supra note 147 at 140 (“all of the evidence on the deterrent effect of certainty of 
punishment pertains to the deterrent effect of the certainty of apprehension, not to the 
certainty of postarrest outcomes (including certainty of imprisonment given conviction)”).  
 153 Bagaric et al., supra note 144, at 1066 (“While there does not seem to be a link 
between higher penalties and less crime, it seems that people are not totally irrational when 
they contemplate committing crime. The evidence shows that to the extent that people make 
a cost-benefit decision about committing crimes, they generally only weigh up the risk of 
being caught, not what will happen when they are apprehended.”).  
 154 Id.  
 155 Mirko Bagaric et al., Technological Incarceration and the End of the Prison Crisis, 
108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 73, 95 (2018). See also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra 
note 147, at 68 (“In contemporary society, the certainty of punishment depends on the 
probability of arrest given a criminal offense and the probability of punishment given an 
arrest. For a formal sanction to be imposed, the crime must be brought to official attention, 
typically by victim report, and the offender must then be apprehended, usually by the police. 
The offender next be charged, successfully prosecuted, and finally sentenced by the 
courts.”).  
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misconduct is not increased prison sentences, but rather increased criminal 
enforcement. 
Individual criminal liability in the HFT space would be especially 
potent in its absolute general deterrence effect.  High-frequency traders 
would be more deterrable than non-white collar offenders because “they 
have more to lose monetarily and in community standing, [] their crimes are 
often calculated to bring about a specific profit[,]” and they “may be more 
fearful of the possibility of jail time.”156  In analyzing the sentence of Raj 
Rajaratnam, Anna Driggers noted that his sentence would: 
likely be an effective deterrent. First, Rajaratnam’s sentence will send a message to a 
specific population of traders, those who consider or engage in insider trading, as they 
see the zeal of prosecutors and their eagerness to use new investigative techniques. 
Second, the sentence upholds well-known securities laws and demonstrates the 
government is serious about enforcing such laws.157 
Due to the almost negligible amount of enforcement against HFT—as 
evidenced by the first high-frequency trading case (Athena) not arising until 
2014 and only one conviction of spoofing since it was criminalized in 
2010—increased criminal enforcement of wrongdoing in the HFT space 
would send an especially strong message to high-frequency traders.158 
Carl Emigholz counters the belief that general deterrence has a greater 
effect on white collar offenders because “certainty of apprehension, celerity 
and severity—the bedrock of deterrence—are lacking in the white-collar 
context.”159  He notes: 
White-collar offenders often assume that they will not be caught. Most studies 
conducted on white collar criminals acknowledge “the serious limitation[] in imputing 
any relationship between those who commit these crimes and the likelihood of 
actually being detected and formally adjudicated for the behavior.” These results are 
intuitive. White-collar criminals often operate within the framework of a complicated, 
legitimate organization, making detection more difficult, they have much greater 
resources to resist prosecution, and the defendant is often of high social standing. 
Additionally, there are not as many resources devoted to detection and prosecution of 
 
 156 See Carl Emigholz, Utilitarianism, Retributivism and the White Collar-Drug Crime 
Sentencing Disparity: Toward a Unified Theory of Enforcement, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 583, 
609 (writing about white collar offenders in general).  
 157 Driggers, supra note 8, at 2036–37.  
 158 Similar to how Rajaratnam’s sentence will send a message to a specific population of 
traders, increased criminal enforcement would likewise send a message to high-frequency 
traders “as they see the zeal of prosecutors and their eagerness to use new investigative 
techniques.” See id.  
 159 Emigholz, supra note 156, at 609.  
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white-collar offenses. The combination of inadequate resources and increased 
complexity greatly hinder effective enforcement.160 
Lucian E. Dervan also raises the possibility that “white collar offenders are 
particularly susceptible to a belief that they will not be detected because of 
the often sophisticated nature of their offenses.”161 
However, both scholars’ arguments necessarily presuppose that there 
would be low enforcement of white collar offenses.  Their arguments are 
exactly why more criminal enforcement is needed in the HFT space.  Given 
the more sophisticated nature of HFT compared to traditional trading, high-
frequency traders may be even more susceptible to the belief that they will 
not be detected.  Thus, increased enforcement of criminal wrongdoing 
committed by HFT would demonstrate to high-frequency traders that even 
though their illegal trading is extremely sophisticated, they are still 
susceptible to detection and punishment.  Therefore, the government, 
without having to increase or demand long prison sentences,162 should 
increase enforcement of criminal wrongdoing by high-frequency traders. 
B. INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY IS PREFERABLE TO 
CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
Once it is determined that criminal law should be used to regulate 
wrongdoing in the HFT space, the decision then turns to whether the 
individual, the firm, or both should be held liable.  The answer is 
resoundingly the individual. 
1. Individual Criminal Liability Better Furthers the Goal of Deterrence 
Corporations do not have certain capacities of natural persons, making 
a basic characteristic of criminal law inapplicable—corporations cannot go 
to jail.163  Without this aspect, criminal corporate liability does nothing to 
 
 160 Id. at 609–10.  
 161 Dervan, supra note 142, at 741.  
 162 See Mirko Bagaric, A Rational Theory of Mitigation and Aggravation in Sentencing: 
Why Less is More When it Comes to Punishing Criminals, 62 BUFF. L. REV. 1159, 1215 
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advance deterrence, a major goal of criminal law.164  By removing the 
possibility of a prison sentence, the penalties imposed by criminal liability 
are effectively those that would be imposed through civil liability, gutting 
an important mechanism for deterrence.165 
Individual criminal liability for corporate wrongdoing is based on the 
premise that individuals culpable of the wrongdoing should be the ones 
being punished.166  Deterrence is furthered by this premise; punishing those 
culpable of wrongful conduct will make such conduct less likely to occur in 
the future.167  However, the greatest deterrent effect comes from holding 
individual actors responsible for wrongdoing.168  By extracting large 
criminal fines from corporations, shareholders bear the cost of wrongdoing 
for the cost of individual actors who actually committed the illegal 
conduct.169  However, shareholders are not engaged in the conduct that 
gives rise to the criminal offense and they are not in a position to prevent 
such corporate wrongdoing.170 
“An organization[,]”Andrew Weissman and David Newman write, 
“cannot control the actions of its employees in the manner that an 
individual typically can control her own actions.”171  While an argument 
can be made that the reputational damage from a criminal conviction would 
generate a sufficient deterrent effect, the reputational impact “is too 
imprecise and sometimes too disconnected from the harm to be prevented 
to serve as a strong justification for imposition of criminal liability.”172  
Additionally, a corporation can take all reasonable efforts to prevent 
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wrongdoing from an employee, and yet an employee may still partake in 
some criminal conduct.173  In such a case, a corporation is lacking in 
volition.174  Lacking volition makes deterrence more difficult.175  Where a 
corporation has already done all that it can to deter and detect illegal 
behavior by its employees, then a major goal of corporate criminal liability 
is satisfied.176  Holding HFT firms that engage in illegal behavior criminally 
liable, without holding those traders who actually conducted the 
wrongdoing liable, may accomplish very little if the firm already has 
institutional mechanisms in place to prevent such behavior.  Thus, criminal 
corporate liability may not efficiently maximize deterrence of the wrongful 
behavior. 
The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) even agreed that more 
individual criminal liability for corporate wrongdoing was needed to 
effectively deter white collar criminal behavior.177  In 2015, the DOJ issued 
guidance in a memo entitled, “Individual Accountability for Corporate 
Wrongdoing” (Yates Memo), encouraging department lawyers to seek 
charges against individuals in cases of corporate wrongdoing.178  According 
to the Yates Memo, such action is important because it incentivizes firms to 
change their behavior, deters future illegal conduct, ensures that those who 
committed the wrongdoing are held accountable for their actions, ensures 
that the proper parties are held responsible for their actions, and fosters 
public confidence in our legal system.179  “One of the most effective ways 
to combat corporate misconduct,” Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates 
wrote, “is by seeking accountability from the individuals who perpetrated 
the wrongdoing.”180  In the antitrust context, the former DOJ Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General for Criminal Enforcement stated that prison 
sentences for individuals convicted of antitrust crimes were “the single 
most effective deterrent to the ‘temptation to cheat the system and profit 
from collusion.’”181  This reasoning similarly applies to the HFT context. 
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Individual criminal liability, accompanied with the threat of prison 
sentences, would help deter high-frequency traders from using their trading 
speeds to cheat the market. 
2. Wrongdoers in HFT are Easily Identifiable 
An argument in favor of corporate criminal liability, as opposed to 
individual criminal liability, is that it finds accountability when the culpable 
individual is not easily identifiable.182  Such situations arise when 
individual culpability is masked by the corporate structure and size of the 
company, making it difficult to investigate and prosecute corporate 
wrongdoing.183  This is not the case with HFT. 
Whereas other types of white collar offenses may include many 
different decisions that are implemented by many different employees, HFT 
involves one person devising a plan and that same person carrying it out—
the trader.  Coscia is illustrative of how, at least in HFT, the trader is easily 
identifiable as the person who planned and conducted the criminal 
conduct.184  As mentioned previously, the creator of the program that 
Coscia utilized to carry out his scheme testified that Coscia had directed 
him to create a program that would cancel orders in certain circumstances, 
demonstrating that Coscia had devised the plan to spoof.185  Coscia was also 
the one to place and cancel orders, creating the false impression of supply 
and demand in the market.186  Thus, Coscia was easily identifiable as the 
individual who planned to spoof, ordered others to assist him in creating a 
computer program capable of carrying out that plan, and conducted the 
actual placement and canceling of trade orders.  Therefore, as illustrated by 
Coscia, the identity problem that corporate criminal liability attempts to 
solve is not nearly as present in HFT. 
3. Individual Criminal Liability Would Lead to Better Consequences 
From a consequentialist approach, pursuing individual criminal 
liability as opposed to corporate criminal liability is more ideal.  Holding 
firms criminally liable for HFT misconduct leads to two suboptimal choices 
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for the government: 1) issuing waivers so that the firm could still operate—
effectively making the criminal conviction meaningless;187 or 2) letting the 
firm suffer the full consequences of a criminal conviction and risk the 
downfall of the corporation.188  The latter would cause many innocent 
employees to lose their jobs189 and would likely be unpopular for 
governments. 
An example of the first choice is the 2015 guilty plea of large banks 
for conspiring to manipulate the Foreign Exchange (FX) market.190  Four 
banks—JPMorgan & Chase Co., Citicorp, the Royal Bank of Scotland PLC, 
and Barclays PLC—pleaded guilty to conspiring to manipulate the price of 
U.S. Dollars and Euros exchanged in the FX spot market.191  The banks 
agreed to pay $2.5 billion in total criminal fines.192  However, aside from 
these fines, the consequences the banks faced for pleading guilty to a felony 
were merely symbolic.193  Although regulators could have barred these 
banks from conducting certain activities, the banks were able to negotiate 
and receive exemptions from regulators.194  For example, by the time the 
guilty pleas were announced, the SEC had already provided several waivers 
to the banks that allowed them “to conduct business as usual[]”—
eviscerating the consequence of a criminal conviction.195  A waiver 
provided to a HFT firm convicted of a crime would similarly strip the 
conviction of any teeth. 
The alternative is an arguably worse outcome. If a convicted HFT firm 
is not granted a waiver to continue operations, then it may need to close 
down.  Many innocent employees and shareholders would lose jobs and 
money as a result.196  For certain statutes, prosecutors only have to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that one employee out of all of a company’s 
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employees violated the law.197  But instead of just that one employee being 
punished, all employees are punished. Rather than punishing the culpable, 
which is supposed to be one of the justifications for criminal law,198 it 
would also punish the innocent.  Therefore, corporate criminal liability 
would be too broad. 
The 2001 Arthur Andersen LLP conviction is illustrative of this.199  
The government never suggested at trial that a part of Arthur Andersen, or 
even senior management, was corrupt.200  The government simply had to 
prove that any one Arthur Andersen employee, out of the 28,000 employed 
in the U.S. at the time, had, beyond a reasonable doubt, “acted knowingly 
and with intent to cause or induce another person or persons to (a) withhold 
a record or document from an official proceeding, or (b) alter, destroy, 
mutilate or conceal an object with intent to impair the object’s availability 
for use in an official proceeding.”201  This prosecution eventually led to the 
demise of Arthur Andersen.202  After a federal jury convicted Arthur 
Andersen “of obstruction of justice in connection with its destruction of 
documents relating to its accounting work for Enron Corporation[]” in June 
2002, the firm agreed to end its practice of auditing public companies—
effectively closing its business.203  As a result, “[a]pproximately 28,000 
people lost their jobs at the company in the United States alone.”204  
Twenty-eight thousand employees were punished due to just one employee 
being convicted beyond a reasonable doubt.205  As this example shows, 
holding HFT firms liable for the acts of any one trader, who does not even 
have to be a part of senior management or have a significant impact on the 
firm, can have disastrous consequences for the rest of the employees who 
may be innocent. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
New technology provides new opportunities to commit crimes,206 and 
HFT is no exception.207  Locking up high-frequency traders who 
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intentionally violate federal regulations may seem like a harsh method of 
regulating HFT.  However, as Coscia has shown, through the intentionality 
element in the anti-spoofing provision and a reasonable doubt standard, 
criminal enforcement of high-frequency traders charged with similar crimes 
will only lead to convictions when there is powerful evidence of their 
wrongdoing.  This Comment does not advocate for a witch hunt of high-
frequency traders, but merely increased criminal enforcement of those 
especially egregious offenders.  Nor does this Comment advocate for long 
prison sentences for convicted high-frequency traders.  The actual prison 
time served could be as short as a few months.  What is important to deter 
high-frequency traders is simply the threat of prosecution, not what happens 
once they are actually caught.208  Due to the infrequency of convictions in 
HFT, increased enforcement would serve notice to other high-frequency 
traders that the government is serious about prosecuting criminal conduct in 
HFT, no matter how sophisticated their new technology is—thus, deterring 
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